The Emerging Syrian–American Alliance: Advisor Karam Khalil Explains Why Damascus Has Become the Linchpin of Middle Eastern Balance

By: Senior Advisor Karam Khalil

Today, Syria is moving from the margins of the map to its center. What was, for years, a security file weighed down by proxy civil wars is now turning into a cornerstone of a new regional and international equation, defined by a Syrian–American partnership oriented toward long-term stability, not the mere management of a postponed crisis.

What is happening is neither a political guess nor a passing tactical maneuver, but a full-fledged strategic shift. Washington, under President Trump, has moved from a policy of “containing Syrian chaos” to investing in a “unified and strong Syria” as the next center of gravity in the Middle East over the coming decade. Those who read the facts as they are understand that the time for betting on partition has ended, and that whoever persists in such illusions now collides not only with the Syrian national will, but with the American position itself.

I. From Confrontation to Partnership – Syria as the Number Two State in the Coalition

U.S. Central Command has announced Syria’s formal accession to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, presenting it as the 90th state in the coalition in purely numerical terms. But in the hierarchy of strategic importance, Syria today is not number 90; it is number 2, right after the United States.

Why?
Because the theater of the war on terror, supply lines, land corridors, and spheres of influence over extremist groups all intersect within Syrian geography. Anyone who fails to grasp this simple fact does not understand the ABCs of strategy.

The distribution of power within Syria is clear: the United States, the Gulf states, and Turkey.
Some will say that Israel is the strongest player. The truth, however, is that while Israel remains a highly sensitive security actor, it is operating this time within a larger project: the American project in Syria. The one who owns the project is the one who writes the rules of the game; the rest move within its margins, not the other way around.

For Turkey and the Gulf, Syria is no longer just a sphere of influence, but a declared matter of national security. All Turkish parties—regardless of ideology—understand that tampering with Syrian geography is a direct threat to Turkey’s own unity. The Gulf, meanwhile, sees the collapse of Syria and the perpetuation of chaos as a danger to its security, borders, markets, and energy architecture. From here we understand why the interests of Washington, Ankara, and Riyadh converge on one point: a unified Syria under the authority of a state, not a patchwork of militias and local warlords.

II. Trump and al-Shar’a: Fixing a New Equation for the Middle East

President al-Shar’a’s visit to Washington was not a conventional diplomatic protocol; it was, in effect, a declaration that Syria is being admitted into a new political club: a broad alliance that includes Arab, European, American, and Turkish states, with organized outreach to China, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Germany in forthcoming tours.

President Trump has now become one of the staunchest defenders of Syria’s unity. This is not rhetorical flourish; it is a political reality reflected in the administration’s behavior:

• Direct pressure on the SDF to accelerate their return to Damascus under the umbrella of the Syrian state, rather than pursuing open-ended self-administration projects that gradually erode territorial integrity.
• Clear support for a Gulf–Turkish–European alignment alongside the new Syria, viewing it as a partner in managing regional order rather than a chronic security burden.
• A near-final security agreement with Israel, built on mutual security guarantees and clear borders, in exchange for a de facto recognition of unified Syria’s role in shaping regional security—rather than backing any actor against the Syrian state.

Taken together, these elements mean that Washington has moved from the logic of “conflict management” to the logic of “rebalancing the region” on the basis of partnership with Syria, not at its expense.

III. Economics as the Entry Point to Consolidating the Alliance – From Frozen Assets to Open Channels

The coming phase will not be primarily military, but political and economic.
A delegation from the U.S. Federal Reserve is preparing to visit Damascus to discuss facilitating financial and investment operations and to open structured channels for capital and companies that see Syria as a promising market and a unique logistical hub linking the Gulf, Turkey, and Europe.

This financial shift is inseparable from the battle against the economy of chaos:

• The formation of a special U.S. committee to pursue captagon traffickers and criminal networks in southern Syria, placing them on blacklists for prosecution and sanctions.
• Draining the resources of the war economy in favor of a state economy, and securing borders in favor of legitimate trade flows rather than cross-border smuggling networks.

In this context, Syria will, within ten years, become the second most influential state in the Middle Eastern equation after Saudi Arabia:
Saudi Arabia, with its financial and oil power and its central role in the energy market; and Syria, with its geostrategic location that reconnects seas to deserts, gas pipelines to railways, and seaports to industrial zones. Anyone who understands this architecture knows why Washington is betting on Syria as a pillar of regional balance, not as a moribund security file.

IV. Damascus’ Responsibilities – Reforming the State Before Demanding Recognition of Its Role

For this opportunity to become a sustainable reality, the new Syrian administration must recognize that legitimacy in the twenty-first century is not granted by slogans but by institutional performance.

In practical terms, this means:

1. Rebuilding the Military and Security Establishment
   • Transforming the army and security services into strictly professional institutions grounded in science, technology, and legal discipline—not in personal or ideological loyalties.
   • Ending the logic of the “leading party” and “single color,” which destroyed public trust in the state and turned institutions into tools for monopolizing power rather than serving citizens.
2. Reforming the Judicial and Legal System
   • Building an independent, highly competent judiciary, shielded from political, sectarian, and regional polarization, capable of managing genuine transitional justice rather than settling scores through legal veneers.
   • Restoring citizens’ trust in the courthouse instead of in the leader or the gun, because the modern state begins at the courtroom door, not at the barracks gate.
3. Launching a State of Competence, Not a State of Slogans
   • Appointing officials on the basis of expertise, skill, and the ability to manage complex files—not on the basis of revolutionary rhetoric or personal history.
   • Embedding technology in every sector: from border management to customs, taxation, and the banking system. States that fail to digitize quickly are pushed to the margins of the global economy.
4. Controlling Weapons and Unifying the Security Decision
   • No serious international alliance can be built with a state where militias share control over security decisions and territory.
   • Unifying arms under the authority of law is the first condition for any real partnership with Washington and other capitals.

Without these steps, Syria will remain a “deferred opportunity” in the eyes of international partners. But if they are implemented seriously, Syria’s position will shift from being a “file” discussed behind closed doors to becoming a “partner” summoned to the table of decision-making, not just the table of justification.

V. Ending the Illusions of Partition and the Projects of Chaos

The new equation is clear:
Whoever bets on partitioning Syria now faces not only Damascus, but Washington, Ankara, and Riyadh together.

• The booby-trapped projects of fake federalism and ethnosectarian cantons have expired.
• Those who continue to sell such illusions ignore the fact that Syrian geography has become a red line for more than one regional and international actor at the same time.
• Anyone who believes they can play the game of “a mini-state here and a federation there” behaves like a cat puffing itself up to mimic the roar of a lion—noise without real power, confronting a coherent strategic project led by Washington this time.

The relationship between Trump and Erdoğan today is part of the architecture of this project, not an exception to it. It is not merely “excellent” on the surface; it reflects a deep convergence of interests around preventing the fragmentation of Syrian geography, regulating spheres of influence, and transforming Syria from a threat to their national security into a partner in securing it.

Conclusion: A Narrow Window of Opportunity – Either a Strong State or a Vacuum That Devours Everyone

Syria is entering a new phase in Washington’s approach to the Syrian file—one based on partnership rather than confrontation, and on genuine stability rather than managed chaos.

The message that Washington is sending, and that Gulf, Turkish, and European capitals are receiving, can be summarized in three points:

1. There is no longer room for dreams of partition or open-ended chaos projects.
2. The United States is betting on a unified, stable Syria as part of a broader regional and international alliance, not as a weak margin caught between competing axes.
3. President al-Shar’a has become part of a new international equation that is redrawing the Middle East; but the success of this equation hinges on Damascus’ ability to repair its domestic house with the necessary speed and depth.

The coming phase will be political and economic par excellence:
Openness and reconstruction instead of wars and fragmentation; investment partnerships instead of a captagon economy; and professional institutions instead of politicized apparatuses.

The question is no longer: Will a Syrian–American alliance take shape?
The question now is: Does the Syrian state possess the institutional courage to act as the true number 2 in this alliance, rather than number 90 on paper?

The answer will not be written in communiqués, but in the courts that deliver justice, the army that obeys the law, the economy that rises, and a state that understands the era of one-color rule is over—and that the Middle East today needs a strong, resilient Syria to restore it to its rightful place on the map of the world.