From a Battleground of Competing Powers to an Architect of Strategic Interests: A Sovereignty Doctrine for a New Syria
By Karam Khalil
Senior Political and Security Advisor for the Middle East
Stand Up America US Foundation
Introduction: Syria at a Strategic Crossroads
The wars stretching from Ukraine to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are no longer isolated conflicts confined to separate battlefields. Together, they reflect a deeper redistribution of international power, where military competition intersects with energy security, maritime trade, regional alliances, and the credibility of longstanding security arrangements.
At the center of this changing landscape stands Syria.
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria faces a historic opportunity to move beyond decades of authoritarian rule, foreign military influence, and geopolitical exploitation. Yet the removal of the previous regime does not automatically restore national sovereignty. Sovereignty must be rebuilt through functioning institutions, credible security structures, economic resilience, and the ability to make independent strategic decisions.
The central question is therefore not simply how Syria can avoid becoming entangled in the conflicts surrounding it. It is how Damascus can make Syrian stability a shared strategic interest for competing international powers without surrendering its freedom of action.
Neutrality without capability produces vulnerability. International engagement without sovereign safeguards creates dependency. Genuine independence requires the institutional strength to cooperate when interests converge and to resist pressure when they do not.
For Syria, the challenge is no longer merely to survive geopolitical competition. It is to establish a position within the emerging regional order that others have a practical interest in respecting.
I. Global Conflicts and the Redistribution of Strategic Power
Russia’s war against Ukraine has reshaped European security, strained military resources, disrupted energy markets, and altered the calculations of governments far beyond Europe. Moscow continues to pursue strategic influence abroad, but the financial and military costs of prolonged confrontation affect the resources available for its external commitments.
In the Middle East, confrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran reflects competing calculations over nuclear capabilities, missile threats, regional influence, deterrence, and freedom of navigation.
Washington’s interests include protecting American personnel and regional partners, preventing terrorist resurgence, and preserving the security of vital transportation corridors. Tehran seeks to maintain deterrence and retain regional leverage, while Israel places the prevention of perceived military threats at the center of its security calculations.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, must balance the security challenges associated with Yemen and the Houthis against its broader priorities of economic transformation, regional stability, and secure maritime commerce.
These conflicts interact through military expenditure, energy prices, trade routes, and changing diplomatic priorities. They do not necessarily share a single strategic purpose, but developments in one theater can alter the balance of power in another.
For Syria, this creates both risks and opportunities.
A country once treated primarily as a theater of proxy competition could become a source of regional stability, intelligence cooperation, secure commercial connectivity, and economic reconstruction.
However, geography alone does not create strategic value. Institutions, security, infrastructure, and political credibility determine whether geography becomes an asset or a liability.
II. Russia’s Military Presence and the Reassertion of Syrian Sovereignty
Russia’s continuing interest in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be dismissed simply because Moscow remains engaged in Ukraine. Russia retains diplomatic influence, military capabilities, and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
Nevertheless, the changing political environment in Damascus creates a legitimate basis for reassessing military arrangements inherited from the Assad era.
The 2017 agreement concerning Russia’s naval facility in Tartus originally provided for a 49-year term, while separate arrangements have governed the Russian presence at Hmeimim Air Base.
The essential issue is not merely whether foreign forces remain on Syrian territory. It is the legal and operational framework governing their presence: jurisdiction, immunity, access, operational authority, accountability, and the Syrian state’s ability to review or terminate commitments.
Any future understanding with Moscow should be evaluated against a fundamental standard: Does it strengthen the authority of Syria’s national institutions, or preserve arrangements that place essential sovereign functions beyond their effective control?
At the same time, Damascus need not interpret sovereignty as diplomatic isolation. It can pursue selective cooperation with Russia while expanding relationships with Ukraine, European governments, and other partners in agriculture, technology, infrastructure, and humanitarian recovery.
Syria should neither become an instrument of Russia’s confrontation with the West nor assume that disagreements between Russia and Israel automatically provide Syria with meaningful security guarantees.
The objective should be a diversified foreign policy in which no external power possesses a permanent veto over Syria’s national decisions.
III. The United States, Iran, and a New Framework for Security Cooperation
Under the former regime, Syrian territory became an important component of Iran’s regional military and logistical network. That arrangement exposed Syria to proxy confrontation, foreign strikes, and competing armed organizations operating beyond effective national accountability.
A new Syrian security doctrine must reject the use of Syrian territory as a platform for external conflicts.
This does not require Damascus to join a competing regional bloc. It requires the state to establish effective control over its borders, military institutions, weapons networks, and decisions involving the use of force.
Here, American and Syrian interests can converge.
The United States has a clear strategic interest in preventing the resurgence of ISIS, disrupting transnational terrorist networks, limiting illicit weapons trafficking, and reducing the likelihood that Syria again becomes a source of regional instability.
Syria has an equally compelling interest in rebuilding professional security institutions, securing its territory, restoring economic activity, and ending the fragmentation of military authority.
These shared interests create an opportunity for a structured security partnership based on defined responsibilities, institutional oversight, intelligence cooperation, and respect for Syrian sovereignty.
Such cooperation must be sustainable beyond individual political leaders or changes in American administrations. It should be grounded in measurable objectives and clearly defined legal arrangements rather than open-ended commitments.
The evolution of American sanctions policy has also created opportunities for economic reengagement. The repeal of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act in December 2025 and broader changes to the U.S. sanctions framework represent important shifts. Nevertheless, sanctions relief does not automatically eliminate banking compliance concerns, export-control requirements, or the commercial risks associated with a fragile post-conflict environment.
Economic normalization requires more than legislative change. It requires predictable institutions, enforceable contracts, financial transparency, and investor confidence.
According to the World Bank, Syria’s nominal gross domestic product declined from approximately $67.5 billion in 2011 to an estimated $21.4 billion in 2024.
This economic contraction demonstrates why rebuilding Syria cannot depend indefinitely on humanitarian assistance or politically motivated financial commitments.
For Washington, a stable Syria could reduce the long-term costs of regional instability and counterterrorism operations. For Damascus, constructive engagement with the United States could support institutional development, investment, and security-sector modernization.
The most durable partnership would be one in which American strategic interests and Syrian national sovereignty reinforce rather than undermine each other.
IV. Israel, the Golan Heights, and the Limits of Security Arrangements
No credible Syrian sovereignty doctrine can ignore the Golan Heights or the continuing security tensions between Syria and Israel.
Syria’s territorial claims are grounded in international law and relevant United Nations resolutions. They cannot be reduced to a secondary consequence of the Israeli-Iranian confrontation.
The 1974 Disengagement Agreement, monitored by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, remains an important mechanism for reducing the risk of direct military confrontation. It is not, however, a final settlement of the territorial dispute.
Damascus faces a difficult strategic balance: rebuilding legitimate national defense capabilities while addressing the security concerns that shape Israeli policy.
This challenge cannot be resolved through rhetoric or unrealistic military calculations.
It requires a distinction between temporary, verifiable arrangements intended to prevent escalation and permanent restrictions that could compromise Syria’s sovereign rights.
International monitoring, diplomatic engagement, and clearly defined confidence-building measures may help reduce immediate risks. But such mechanisms should not establish indefinite foreign authority over Syrian territory or defense policy.
Avoiding war does not mean abandoning national rights. Equally, defending those rights does not require Syria to enter a military confrontation for which it is not prepared.
A disciplined strategy must preserve Syria’s legal position, protect civilians, deter destabilizing actions where possible, and maintain diplomatic options.
For American policymakers, a more stable Syrian-Israeli security environment would also serve the broader objective of preventing renewed regional escalation.
V. Regional Partnerships: Turning Geography into Economic Leverage
Syria occupies a potentially important position connecting Türkiye, Iraq, Jordan, the Gulf, and the Mediterranean.
Yet strategic geography should not be confused with economic competitiveness.
Trade corridors succeed when they offer lower costs, reliable infrastructure, efficient customs procedures, predictable regulations, and adequate security. Without those conditions, geographical proximity alone provides little advantage.
Syria therefore needs a realistic regional connectivity strategy based on commercially credible projects rather than ambitious declarations.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states could become significant partners in infrastructure, energy, transportation, and investment. Türkiye, Iraq, and Jordan have their own interests in border security, trade, energy integration, and regional stability.
These interests create opportunities for cooperation, even where political disagreements persist.
Energy infrastructure should be an early priority.
In June 2025, the World Bank approved a $146 million grant to support Syria’s electricity sector, including the rehabilitation of transmission infrastructure and damaged substations. At the time, the Bank reported that years of conflict had reduced electricity availability in many areas to approximately two to four hours per day.
Reliable electricity is not simply a public-service requirement. It is essential to industrial production, water systems, healthcare, transportation, and investment.
The broader reconstruction challenge is immense.
The World Bank estimates that rebuilding Syria’s damaged physical assets could cost approximately $216 billion, including $82 billion for infrastructure, $75 billion for residential buildings, and $59 billion for nonresidential structures. This estimate concerns physical reconstruction and does not represent the full cost of Syria’s economic and social recovery.
The strategic response should not be to announce as many projects as possible.
It should be to identify a limited number of high-impact investments, conduct independent feasibility assessments, establish transparent procurement procedures, and measure results against productivity, employment, fiscal returns, and service reliability.
Syria’s regional economic role will ultimately depend less on its location on a map than on the credibility of its institutions and the performance of its infrastructure.
VI. Internal Consolidation and the Doctrine of Productive Sovereignty
A state cannot negotiate effectively with major powers while its own security and economic decision-making remain fragmented.
The first requirement of sustainable sovereignty is therefore the creation of unified national defense and security institutions operating under lawful civilian authority.
This means more than incorporating armed formations into official structures on paper.
It requires unified chains of command, professional standards for recruitment and promotion, transparent financing, accountable leadership, and appropriate demobilization and reintegration programs.
Security consolidation must also be accompanied by judicial reform, protection of property rights, transitional justice, and credible mechanisms for resolving disputes among Syria’s communities and regions.
A centralized security apparatus without the rule of law would risk reproducing the very conditions that undermined Syria’s stability in the past.
Economic reconstruction presents a parallel challenge.
Major public contracts, strategic infrastructure, and foreign investment agreements must be subject to transparent procedures and independent oversight. Otherwise, reconstruction funding could reinforce patronage networks and create new sources of domestic instability.
These requirements point toward what may be described as a doctrine of Productive Sovereignty.
Productive Sovereignty is the capacity of a state to translate political independence into effective security institutions, economic productivity, and diversified international partnerships.
It rests on three mutually reinforcing foundations: legitimate national control over security decisions; a productive economic and fiscal base that reduces external dependency; and the ability to maintain multiple international relationships without surrendering strategic autonomy.
This is not a doctrine of equidistance between competing powers.
It is a doctrine of disciplined national interest.
Every major foreign agreement should be assessed according to its effect on Syrian decision-making, institutional capability, technology transfer, employment, public revenue, and long-term national security.
The objective is not to avoid international influence altogether—an unrealistic ambition for any state—but to ensure that cooperation expands Syria’s options rather than progressively narrowing them.
VII. From Strategic Vision to Measurable National Priorities
A credible national strategy must be implemented through sequenced decisions.
Within the first six months of adopting this approach, Damascus should establish a comprehensive inventory of foreign military, security, and economically significant agreements, clarify negotiating authority, and begin a systematic review of arrangements affecting sovereign institutions.
In parallel, the government should establish measurable priorities for security-sector integration, border management, and protection of critical infrastructure.
Economic planning should concentrate on a small portfolio of investment-ready projects supported by credible legal documentation, feasibility studies, and transparent financing structures.
The government should also begin collecting reliable operational data on border-crossing times, transportation costs, customs performance, and port capacity before committing to major regional transit initiatives.
Over the following two years, priorities should include strengthening judicial independence, improving electricity reliability, modernizing customs and ports, expanding legitimate domestic revenue, and improving the effectiveness of national institutions.
Progress should be measured through outcomes rather than announcements: investment actually deployed, infrastructure restored, customs delays reduced, public services improved, security command structures consolidated, and confidence in state institutions strengthened.
This approach is particularly important because the outcomes of today’s international conflicts remain uncertain.
The war in Ukraine may end through negotiation, prolonged stalemate, or continued attrition. U.S.-Iranian tensions may move toward limited accommodation or renewed confrontation. Maritime security in the Red Sea may improve or deteriorate.
Syria cannot build its future around a single prediction.
If regional tensions decline, it should be positioned to expand trade and attract investment. If they intensify, it must be capable of protecting essential infrastructure, securing its borders, preserving diplomatic channels, and avoiding involuntary participation in external conflicts.
A successful strategy does not depend on correctly predicting who will prevail in every confrontation.
It creates the institutional resilience necessary to protect national interests regardless of the outcome.
Conclusion: Syria Must Become a State That Cannot Be Ignored
Syria has paid an extraordinary price for becoming a battleground on which other powers pursued their interests.
The end of the Assad era creates an opportunity to break that pattern. But replacing one external dependency with another would not constitute a genuine strategic transformation.
The test of Syria’s new leadership will not be the number of foreign governments it engages or the prominence of its diplomatic meetings. It will be whether those relationships strengthen national institutions, improve security, create economic opportunity, and preserve the country’s freedom of action.
Damascus should engage Moscow without dependency, develop security cooperation with Washington without granting an open-ended mandate, build mutually beneficial partnerships with its regional neighbors, and defend its territorial rights through international law, diplomacy, and credible national capabilities.
For the United States and its partners, a stable, institutionally capable Syria offers a strategic opportunity: a country better equipped to resist terrorist resurgence, reduce regional conflict, secure legitimate commerce, and contribute to a more predictable Middle Eastern security environment.
For Syria, the objective must be even more fundamental: to ensure that its future is determined by the strength of its institutions and the interests of its people rather than by the outcome of conflicts beyond its borders.
Syria will not reclaim its strategic standing by choosing the strongest side in the world’s conflicts. It will do so by building a state whose sovereignty, stability, and national interests are stronger than its dependence on any external power.
© BA. Karam Khalil — Senior Security-Political Advisor
